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IS THE DECK STACKED AGAINST 
INTERNET GAMBLING? A COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REGULATION 
Nicholas Bamman* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has fundamentally changed the face of gambling. 
With the click of a mouse, a person can wager money in real time 
from anywhere in the world.1 Over the past two decades, millions 
of customers have used online casinos to play poker, blackjack, 
and other games.2 To some, Internet gambling is a harmless 
pastime, but to others the explosion of Internet gambling represents 
a financial and social threat to their community.3 
Since its inception in the mid-1990s, Internet gambling has 
quickly become the highest grossing internet-based industry.4 In 
fact, Internet gambling has boasted an average annual growth of 
                                                          
 *J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A., 2006, Political Science 
and International Studies, Northwestern University. I would like to thank my 
family for their unbridled love and the journal staff for their insight and support. 
1 See, e.g., PARTYGAMING, http://www.partygaming.com (last visited Aug. 
24, 2010). 
2  See, e.g., How Many People Gamble Online?, CASINO BONUSES, 
http://www.bonusbomb.com/gambling/how-many-people-gamble-online.html 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2010) (“Although the exact size of the online gaming 
industry is unknown, the current number of online gamblers is in the millions, 
and analysts agree that industry growth is rapid.”). 
3 E.g., NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, NATIONAL 
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, ch. 7, at 7-3 (1999), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/7.pdf [hereinafter 
NGISC, ch. 7]. 
4 Dana Gale, The Economic Incentive Behind the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 533 (2009). 
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more than 20%,5 culminating in an estimated $24 billion of 
revenue in 2010.6 Despite recent legislation designed to curtail the 
industry, Americans still comprise an estimated 25% of the global 
market.7 
Since the birth of Internet gambling, the Department of Justice 
prosecuted online gambling executives pursuant to antigambling 
laws written before the advent of the Internet.8 As a result, 
American entrepreneurs initiated Internet gambling companies 
overseas.9 As money flows directly to Internet gambling 
companies abroad, Internet gambling drains billions of dollars 
annually from the American economy.10 Indeed, the United States 
derives no tangible national benefit, but suffers all of the social 
costs, of Internet gambling.11  
In 2006, Congress passed the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”) to address these concerns.12 The 
UIGEA prohibits American financial institutions from processing 
fund transfers to Internet gambling companies and their affiliates, 
thereby eliminating the funding for Internet gambling.13 Under this 
framework, American financial institutions carry the burden of 
policing these Internet gambling fund transfers.14 However, the 
                                                          
5 Anne Von Lehman, American Entrepreneurs and Internet Gambling: Are 
the Odds Stacked Against Them?, 3 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 135, 137–39 (2008). 
6 See Rich Cholodofsky, Internet Gambling Perplexes Officials, TRIBLIVE 
(Jan. 15, 2006), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_413842.html. 
7 Eric Pfanner, A New Chance for Online Gambling in the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/technology/internet/ 
27iht-gamble.html?scp=1&sq=A%20New%20Chance%20for%20Online%20 
Gambling%20in%20the%20U.S&st=cse. 
8 See infra Part I.A. 
9 See Von Lehman, supra note 5, at 137. 
10 Gale, supra note 4, at 547. 
11 See Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition: The Federal 
Government’s Approach to Internet Gambling, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
162, 166 (2009) (describing addiction and underage gambling as social costs of 
online gambling). See also infra Part II.B. 
12 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 
5361(a) (West 2010). Other principal concerns included debt collection 
problems for the consumer credit industry and money laundering. Id. 
13 See id. § 5363. 
14 Id. 
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UIGEA does not criminalize Internet gambling at the customer 
level either by fine or incarceration.15  
To evaluate whether any legislation is beneficial to the United 
States, it is necessary to scrutinize the legislation’s costs and 
benefits—both economic and social.16 To the extent benefits 
exceed costs, the legislation bestows a net benefit to the United 
States. When there is more than one legislative option, the cost-
benefit analysis of each option must be compared against one 
another. The option that bestows the largest net benefit is the 
legislative most favorable to the United States.  
In applying this theory to gambling law, a cost-benefit analysis 
of the UIGEA alone provides minimal insight. While the UIGEA 
may bestow a net benefit to the United States over a complete 
absence of legislation, it is impossible to know whether the 
UIGEA has provided the largest net benefit possible absent a 
comparison to other legislative options. Therefore, this Note will 
compare the costs and benefits of the UIGEA with the Internet 
Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act17 (“Regulation Bill”) proposed by Representative Barney 
Frank and the Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement 
Act18 (“Taxation Bill”) proposed by Representative James 
McDermott (collectively “Proposed Bills”). These Proposed Bills 
operate in tandem to create a framework to license, regulate, and 
tax Internet gambling. This Note will analyze the costs and 
benefits of the UIGEA compared with the costs and benefits of the 
Proposed Bills. The results of that analysis should indicate that the 
Proposed Bills bestow a larger net benefit to the United States than 
the UIGEA. 
                                                          
15 See id. §§ 5361–67. 
16 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC REASONING, 3–21 
(6th ed. 2003), for an in depth discussion and analysis of the legal economic 
analysis. For the foundation to the theory, see generally Ronald H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For the purposes of this Note, 
the theory behind law and economics need not be scrutinized thoroughly. This 
Note attempts a comparative analysis, not a quantitative one. 
17 Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. (2009). 
18 Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 
2268, 111th Cong. (2009). 
234 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Part I of this Note explores the current state of American 
Internet gambling legislation. Part II examines the costs and 
benefits of the UIGEA. Part III examines the costs and benefits of 
the Proposed Bills. Part IV explores potential improvements to the 
Proposed Bills. Finally, the conclusion weighs the costs and 
benefits of the Proposed Bills against those of the UIGEA. 
I. EXISTING GAMBLING LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
WHAT’S THE DEAL? 
Previous legislation failed to curtail Internet gambling in part 
because Internet gambling reaches consumers in a nontraditional 
manner.19 To wager on the Internet, customers must deposit money 
into an online gambling account.20 Before the UIGEA limited 
deposit method options, Internet gamblers funded accounts with 
credit cards, checks, e-checks, money orders, “e-wallets,”21 or 
other transaction devices.22 After funding an account, a customer 
could wager on casino games such as blackjack, roulette, poker, or 
even backgammon.23 To withdraw or cash out, customers used the 
same process in reverse, eventually receiving a credit to his or her 
bank account.24  
Internet gambling sites have accepted deposits, processed 
wagers, and transmitted payouts without ever physically touching 
American soil, which has created enormous jurisdictional problems 
                                                          
19 Internet gambling companies never have to submit to U.S. jurisdiction 
and there is no physical product to regulate. 
20 See, e.g., Playing with Real Money, POKERSTARS, http://www.poker 
stars.com/poker/real-money/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2010) (providing instructions 
on current valid methods depending on the customer’s country of residence). 
21 E-wallets are third party transfer companies, such as PayPal. See, e.g., 
Top Ten Things to Know About Pay Pal, PAYPAL, https://personal. 
paypal.com/cgi-bin/marketingweb?cmd=_render-content&content_ID= 
marketing_us/PayPal_FAQ (last visited Sept. 2, 2010). PayPal acts as an 
intermediary in all types of transactions over the Internet—not just gambling, 
and allows customers to make purchases at several online vendors while limiting 
their financial information to just one company. Id. 
22 See POKERSTARS, supra note 20. 
23 See, e.g., PARTYGAMING, supra note 1. 
24 See, e.g., Cashout Policy, POKERSTARS, http://www.pokerstars.com/ 
poker/real-money/cashouts/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2010). 
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for American law enforcement officials.25 In general, these 
companies have paid taxes and abided by their respective country’s 
Internet gambling laws.26 Thus, foreign governments are unlikely 
to extradite executives for prosecution in the United States.27 
A. American Gambling Law Prior to the UIGEA 
The interplay between federal, state, and tribal gambling law 
has created a confusing array of rules. Historically, the federal 
government left gambling regulation to the states and only passed 
legislation to protect state sovereignty.28 Although state gambling 
laws vary drastically, all fifty states except Hawaii and Utah have 
some form of legal gambling.29 Even within state boundaries, 
however, laws may differ due to sovereign tribal legislation.30  
For example, the federal Wire Act of 1961 prohibits 
bookmakers31 from taking bets in states where gambling is illegal 
                                                          
25 See Michael J. Vener, Internet Gambling Law: Is Prohibition Really 
Good Policy?, 15 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 199, 211–14 (2008). 
26 See id. at 214. 
27 See id. Gambling companies provide large benefits for safe haven 
countries. For example, Antiguan gambling companies provide millions in 
government revenue and employ nearly 5% of its 68,000 citizens. Katherine A. 
Valasek, Winning the Jackpot: A Framework for Successful International 
Regulation of Online Gambling and the Value of the Self-Regulating Entities, 
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 753, 768 (2007). 
28 See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 
5362(10)(A) (West 2010) (defining gambling by existing state and federal law); 
Interstate Wire Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084(a) (West 2010) (protecting states that 
prohibit gambling by disallowing wagers transmitted via the telephone wire). 
See also Jason A. Miller, Don’t Bet on This Legislation: The Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act Places a Bigger Burden on Financial Institutions 
than Internet Gambling, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 185, 189 (2008) (explaining the 
Congress’ intent behind these laws.). 
29 Miller, supra note 28, at 188–89; see Ian Urbina, States Face Drop in 
Gambling Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009,  http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/09/10/us/10gambling.html?hp (noting that forty-two states have state run 
lotteries, twelve have commercial casinos, twenty-nine states have Indian 
casinos, and twelve have “racinos”—horseracing with slots machines and other 
gambling games.). 
30 See Indian Gaming Regulation, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–21 (West 2010).  
31 A bookmaker is “a person who determines odds and receives bets on the 
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and delivering those bets via the telephone “wire” to states where 
the bets are legal.32 Congress did not want legal gambling in one 
state to effectively legalize gambling in all states.33 The 
Department of Justice has taken the position that the Wire Act 
covers Internet gambling, although the Act makes no mention of 
the Internet or electronic communications.34 Indeed, the text of the 
statute and court decisions have limited the Wire Act to apply only 
to sports betting.35 Consequently, law enforcement officials 
required a regulatory mechanism that would enable them to 
prosecute online gambling executives who do not specialize in 
sports betting.  
However, it has never been Congress’s intention to ban Internet 
gambling entirely.36 Presumably, if Internet gambling presents a 
net loss to the United States, then all forms of Internet gambling 
should be banned. Instead, the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 
(IHA), enacted to “further the horseracing and legal off-track 
betting industries in the United States,” openly promotes domestic 
horserace gambling over the Internet.37 As amended in 2000, the 
IHA protects off-track wagers placed “via telephone or other 
                                                          
outcome of events, esp. sports events.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004). 
32 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084 (West 2010). 
33 See Jeffrey Rodefer, Federal Wire Wager Act, GAMBLING LAW US, 
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Federal-Laws/wire-act.htm (last visited Sept. 
1, 2010) (stating that the Wire Act was intended to help states in enforcing their 
respective laws on gambling and bookmaking). 
34 Valasek, supra note 27, at 757. 
35 Compare United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (using the 
Wire Act to prosecute an Internet sports gambling company executive), 
with Thompson v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(prohibiting reliance on the Wire Act where plaintiffs failed to allege defendants 
engaged in Internet sports gambling). Under this interpretation, the Wire Act 
could not be used to prosecute executives of online poker companies. See 
Thompson, 313 F.3d at 262. 
36 See Interstate Horseracing, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001–3007 (West 2010) 
(permitting horserace gambling over the Internet). See also Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363 (West 2010) (prohibiting 
American financial institutions from processing fund transfers to Internet 
gambling companies unless an exemption, such as horserace gambling, applies). 
37 15 U.S.C.A. § 3001. 
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electronic media.”38 The amendment essentially legalizes and 
regulates domestic Internet gambling on horse races, and prohibits 
foreign competition.39 Had the UIGEA not specifically carved out 
an exception for horseracing,40 this lucrative industry would have 
been eliminated.41 As these two examples demonstrate, Congress 
sometimes takes conflicting positions with respect to Internet 
gambling legislation. 
B. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 
Legislators attached the UIGEA to the enormously popular 
SAFE Port Act,42 which passed by an overwhelming majority in 
the house and unanimously in the Senate.43 Although Internet 
gambling and traditional gambling offer the same games, the 
UIGEA’s Congressional findings note that there are social costs 
particular to Internet gambling.44 Congress further noted that 
“Internet gambling is a growing cause of debt collection problems 
for insured depository institutions and the consumer credit 
                                                          
38 Id. § 3002(3). 
39 See, e.g., Yevgeniya Roysen, Taking Chances: The United States’ Policy 
on Internet Gambling and its International Implications, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 873, 878, 882–86 (2009). 
40 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(10)(B)(iii). 
41 See infra Part II.B.1. (describing the principal role this exemption played 
in America’s World Trade Organization dispute, resulting in billions of dollars 
of sanctions and trade concessions). 
42 Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West 
2010) [hereinafter SAFE Port Act]. The SAFE Port Act was passed to increase 
port security in response to threats of terrorism. H.R. REP. NO. 109-347, at 1 
(2006). Its enormous popularity made it politically difficult to vote against the 
bill. 
43 Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
347, 75 Stat. 1884. 
44 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 
5361(3) (West 2010). Empirical evidence for the social costs appear in the rather 
out-of-date National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report. See NGISC, 
ch.7, supra note 3 (stating, for example, that Internet gambling is less regulated 
than casino resorts and will incur more social costs by permitting easier access 
to gambling services). However, the Internet gambling landscape has changed 
dramatically since 1999. This Note will use updated sources, where available, to 
analyze new empirical data.  
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industry.”45 Ironically, the financial institutions that provide these 
services—the institutions that the law purports to protect—are 
adamantly opposed to the legislation.46 
The UIGEA prohibits financial transaction providers (“FTPs”) 
from processing restricted transactions to Internet gambling sites.47 
Restricted transactions encompass a broad swath of financial 
interactions. “No person engaged in the business of betting or 
wagering may knowingly accept, in connection with the 
participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling:”48 
(1) credit; (2) electronic transfers; (3) checks; and (4) other 
financial instruments to be decided by future regulation.49 The 
legislation places the onus of policing restricted transactions on 
FTPs, and provides both civil and criminal penalties for 
noncompliance.50 However, the UIGEA explicitly exempts certain 
activities that would otherwise fall within the statute such as 
fantasy sports, horseracing (but not dog racing), gambling on tribal 
                                                          
45 31 U.S.C.A. § 5361(c). The sparse congressional record on this issue also 
cited underage gambling and problem gambling as increasing concerns. 152 
CONG. REC. S11045-01 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl), 
available at 2006 WL 3330257. 
46 See Miller, supra note 28, at 201–04. 
47 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5363–5364. FTPs are creditors, credit card issuers, 
electronic fund transmitters, money transmitting businesses, payment 
processors, stored value product transaction providers, electronic fund 
processors, money transmitting services, or any other participant in a designated 
payment system. Id. § 5362(4). In other words, the UIGEA affects many 
American financial institutions. 
48 Id. § 5363. A wager is defined as staking something of value on a 
contest, sporting event or game subject to chance. Id. § 5362(1)(A). Some 
advocates have questioned whether “a game subject to chance” includes games 
such as poker, backgammon, scrabble, or other games that contain an element of 
chance, but also require a great deal of skill. See Michael A. Tselnik, Check, 
Raise, or Fold: Poker and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1617, 1643–50 (2007), for a more in-depth discussion on the 
interplay between luck and skill. 
49 31 U.S.C.A. § 5363. The Treasury has already passed the “future 
regulation” mentioned in the section. See infra Part I.C. 
50 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5365–5366. The UIGEA provides for injunctions against 
companies permitting restricted transactions and/or up to five years 
imprisonment. Id. 
 Is the Deck Stacked Against Internet Gambling? 239 
lands, state lotteries, and investing in financial securities.51 These 
exemptions provide critics with ammunition to question whether 
the exceptions undermine the prohibition.52  
To further complicate matters, the meaning of unlawful 
Internet gambling itself is vague. The UIGEA defines Internet 
gambling by cross-referencing existing federal, state and tribal 
laws.53 As these laws vary enormously by jurisdiction, large FTPs 
operating across the United States are responsible for knowing 
fifty different state laws and adjusting their regulatory mechanisms 
accordingly.54 FTPs have expressed particular concern because 
judicial interpretations of federal law differ by jurisdiction.55 In 
addition, absent specific lists of prohibited transactions, FTPs will 
have to err on the side of compliance by over-restricting.56 
Although the UIGEA limits FTPs’ civil liability for prohibiting 
legitimate transactions on the mistaken, but reasonable belief, that 
they were restricted transactions;57 FTPs have not been shy in 
expressing their discontent.58  
C. The Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Congress mandated that the Federal Reserve System and the 
Department of the Treasury (“Agencies”) promulgate regulations 
to implement the provisions of the UIGEA within 270 days of the 
bill’s passage.59 On November 18, 2008, more than 700 days after 
                                                          
51 Id. § 5362(1)(E). 
52 The drafters of the UIGEA likely realized that absent specific 
exemptions, the legislation would prohibit many transactions Americans take for 
granted. Stocks, mutual funds and financial securities would all be subject to 
prohibition because they “stake something of value on an uncertain outcome.” 
See id. § 5362(1)(A). 
53 Id. § 5362(10)(A). 
54 Miller, supra note 28, at 202.  
55 See id. 
56 For example, FTPs worry that over-restricting customers’ legitimate 
transactions may hamper global competitiveness. See id. at 206–08. 
57 31 U.S.C.A. § 5364(d)(2). 
58 See Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 73 Fed. Reg. 
69382, 69383 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 233) [hereinafter 
PFUIG]. 
59 31 U.S.C.A. § 5364(a). 
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former President Bush signed the UIGEA, the Agencies finally 
passed the Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling 
(“PFUIG”).60 This delay led critics to question whether the U.S. 
government was fully committed to enforcing the UIGEA.61 
Agency officials, on the other hand, blamed the delay on the vague 
language of the UIGEA.62  
The PFUIG requires FTPs to either: a) develop regulations that 
are reasonably designed to prohibit restricted transactions, or; b) 
comply with non-exclusive examples of regulation.63 The most 
onerous provision requires FTPs to perform due diligence checks 
for restricted transactions on new and existing customers.64 
However, the PFUIG provides some latitude by permitting FTPs to 
develop their own mechanisms to determine whether a commercial 
customer presents a “minimal risk of engaging in an Internet 
gambling business.”65 Although FTPs are exempt from performing 
due diligence checks on some payment systems ostensibly due to 
cost considerations,66 there are no exemptions for card systems and 
money transmitting businesses.67 Commentators noted that the 
exemptions for FTPs undermined the efficacy of the regulations.68 
                                                          
60 PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at 69382.  
61 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 28, at 196 (noting that “[t]his delay led 
Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.) to question the intentions of the Treasury 
Department. ‘Are they going to be committed to enforcing this law,’ Brownback 
asked, ‘and putting the personnel in place that it needs[?]’”). 
62 Id. 
63 See PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at § 5(a)–(b). Designated payment systems 
include automated clearing house systems, card systems, check collection 
systems, and money transmitting business. Id. § 3. The designated “Federal 
functional regulator,” or if none exists, the Federal Trade Commission, will be 
responsible for enforcement. Id. § 5(c). 
64 See id. § 6(b). The PFUIG also provides non-exclusive examples of due 
diligence that, if followed, carry a presumption of compliance. Id. 
65 Id. § 6. 
66 Miller, supra note 28, at 200.  
67 Id. Card systems and money transmitting businesses include credit cards 
and money delivery companies such as Western Union. See Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(11)(E) (West 2010). 
68 See Kristina L. Perry, Afterword, The Current State of the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act and Recently Adopted Prohibition on 
Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 29, 33–
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For example, banks are only required to perform due diligence 
checks on commercial customers, but not for personal banking 
customers.69 Furthermore, only the depository bank is responsible 
for check collection systems.70 Therefore, the PFUIG would not 
restrict an Internet gambling company’s payout to a customer via 
check if the Internet gambling company used a foreign bank 
account. 
Pragmatically, FTPs will have trouble policing restricted 
transactions as required by the PFUIG because entrepreneurs are 
able to constantly open new foreign e-wallets to process Internet 
gambling transactions.71 If an FTP refuses to process the 
transactions of a specific e-wallet, that same e-wallet can 
reincorporate under a different name, and elude detection in a 
subsequent due diligence check.72  
The government’s prosecution of Neteller and its executives is 
a revealing example of just how difficult it can be to distinguish 
between e-wallets that process restricted transactions and those that 
do not. Neteller was an e-wallet from the Isle of Man, used for all 
types of Internet purchases, although Internet gambling 
transactions represented the bulk of Neteller’s revenue.73 In 2007, 
the U.S. government arrested the Canadian owners of Neteller 
while they were in the United States,74 and froze millions of dollars 
of Neteller assets.75 After negotiations, Neteller agreed to pay a 
                                                          
34 (2008). 
69 PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at § 6(e).  
70 Id. § 4(b). 
71 Miller, supra note 28, at 204–05.   
72 Id. at 205. 
73 Neteller Founders Arrested by FBI, Charged with Money Laundering, 
POKER PAGES (Jan. 17, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.pokerpages.com/poker-
news/news/neteller-founders-arrested-by-fbi-charged-with-money-laundering-
29454.htm. Customers used Neteller to confine their financial information to 
just one merchant, decreasing opportunities for identity theft and fraud. See 
Miller, supra note 28, at 204–05 (describing how individuals can use money 
transmitting businesses to keep their financial information secure).  
74 Christopher Costigan, NETeller Founders Arrested in U.S., 
GAMBLING911.COM (Jan. 15, 2007, 6:39 PM), http://www.gambling911.com/ 
NETeller-Founders-Arrested-011507.html. 
75 Amy Calistri, Neteller Announces US Distribution Plans for Frozen 
Funds, POKERNEWS (June 4, 2007, 6:39 PM), http://www.pokernews.com/ 
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$136 million penalty to the U.S. government to avoid 
prosecution.76 Subsequently, the U.S. government unfroze 
Neteller’s customers’ accounts.77 Thus, the U.S. government froze 
the funds of millions of Neteller customers, although many of the 
affected customers had never transferred a single dollar to an 
Internet gambling account.78 The prosecution of Neteller illustrates 
that the government itself has found it difficult to cast a net that 
captures only restricted transactions. It is unreasonable to expect 
FTPs to fare better.79 
II. EFFECTS OF THE UIGEA AND PFUIG 
To properly assess the net benefit of the UIGEA and PFUIG, it 
is necessary to analyze the costs and benefits. Although this 
analysis will not yield a precise numeric result, the benefits can be 
compared categorically with the benefits of the Proposed Bills. 
A. Benefits of the UIGEA and PFUIG 
The UIGEA has slowed the explosive growth rate of Internet 
gambling in the United States.80 Although private ownership of 
foreign Internet gambling companies makes it difficult to estimate 
the extent of the Internet gambling market, one study from H2 
Gambling Capital81 estimated that the United States contributed $6 
billion to the $22.6 billion global Internet gambling market in 
                                                          
news/2007/06/neteller-announces-plan-frozen-funds.htm. 
76 Neteller Back in Business, EXTRA (July 26, 2007, 3:34 PM), 
http://www.onlinecasinoextra.com 
/casino_news_1010.html. 
77 See id. 
78 See TheDo, Neteller Update about Frozen Accounts, POCKET FIVES (Feb. 
3, 2007, 9:15 PM), http://www.pocketfives.com/f7/neteller-update-about-frozen-
accounts-65931/. 
79 See Miller, supra note 28, at 204–05. 
80 See Von Lehman, supra note 5, at 144. 
81 H2 Gambling Capital is considered the leading Internet gambling 
research company globally. See About H2, H2 GAMBLING CAPITAL, 
http://www.h2gc.com/aboutus.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). 
PricewaterhouseCoopers derives its calculations from research performed by H2 
Gambling Capital. See id. 
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2008.82 By contrast, immediately preceding the passage of the 
UIGEA in 2006, the United States contributed $3–4.2 billion to a 
$6 billion market.83 Although Internet gambling revenue derived 
from American customers increased in real terms, the UIGEA 
approximately halved the percentage of American contribution to 
the industry as a whole.84  
In addition, the UIGEA provides social benefits by curbing 
gambling addiction.85 Generally speaking, problem gamblers file 
bankruptcy at 4–5 times the national rate and are more likely to 
commit crimes and be arrested.86 Moreover, adolescents between 
the ages of 12–18, who are more susceptible to gambling 
addiction, have reported gambling by traditional means at a median 
rate of 85%.87 If these traditional gambling statistics apply equally 
to Internet gambling, legalization of Internet gambling could 
increase social costs enormously because everyone in the United 
States with an Internet connection will have access to gambling 
services. Therefore, by increasing the difficulty of accessing 
Internet gambling, the UIGEA should curb the rates of problem 
gambling, underage gambling, and bankruptcies.88 The fewer 
                                                          
82 Pfanner, supra note 7.  
83 See Von Lehman, supra note 5, at 139. 
84 Id. These statistics may indicate that Internet gambling simply became 
popular earlier in America than other countries. However, even if the UIGEA is 
not responsible for the full slowdown, common sense dictates that the UIGEA at 
least contributed. 
85 See generally NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION, 
NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, ch. 5 (1999), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf (describing how 
“problem gamblers” are “susceptible to problems with Internet gambling”) 
[hereinafter NGISC, ch.5]. 
86 See NGISC, ch. 7, supra note 3, at 7-16. 
87 Id. at 7-20. Only 1% of adolescents reported having gambled in a casino. 
Id. Whether Internet casinos could equally restrict adolescents remains to be 
seen. 
88 See generally id. (describing various social problems associated with 
gambling). Of course, this assumes that the removal of casinos has the opposite 
effect as the opening of new casinos. Another issue with this analysis is that 
problem gamblers are the least likely group to be deterred by additional 
transaction costs due to addiction. Currently, there is no empirical data to assess 
whether the UIGEA has successfully decreased problem gambling. 
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people that have access to Internet gambling, the less social costs 
the United States should suffer from Internet gambling. 
Although the UIGEA does not criminalize Internet gambling at 
the user level, the UIGEA does create higher access costs because 
gamblers are forced to find ways around the UIGEA.89 A general 
rule of economic theory is that higher transaction costs discourage 
specific behavior.90 Therefore, in theory, the UIGEA discourages 
Internet gambling by prohibiting the most convenient methods of 
funding Internet gambling accounts, such as credit cards.91 Credit 
cards are especially problematic due to the potential to quickly 
accumulate debt beyond one’s means.92 By eliminating American 
credit cards as a method of funding Internet gambling, the UIGEA 
has increased the transactions costs of Internet gambling. As a 
result, bankruptcies and excessive credit card debt should decrease. 
To the extent that Americans stop or never start gambling over the 
Internet due to these considerations, the UIGEA has been a 
success.93 
B. The Costs of Prohibition 
There are two principal categories of costs: economic and 
social. This section will consider each of these categories in order 
to facilitate a comparison with the Proposed Bills. 
                                                          
89 Even if the UIGEA does not stop the dedicated Internet gambler from 
funding an account, the increased difficulty involved with funding an account 
will certainly deter the casual gambler. 
90 See POSNER, supra note 16, at 1–13. 
91 The UIGEA does not provide FTPs an exemption for credit cards. See 
PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at § 4 (listing exemptions). 
92 See generally NGISC, ch. 7, supra note 3 (describing financial and credit 
issues associated with gambling). 
93 Unfortunately, the UIGEA did not mandate any research to document 
whether and how the bill was a success. As a result, the benefits of the UIGEA 
are difficult to quantify, while the costs of the UIGEA are far easier to quantify. 
Strikingly, nobody can accurately estimate how many people stopped gambling 
over the Internet as a result of the UIGEA. 
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1. Economic Costs 
The UIGEA has particularly affected American FTPs. In the 
context of a severe recession, the imposition of expensive 
regulations decreases American FTPs’ global competitiveness.94 
To avoid regulation, commercial customers have an incentive to 
use foreign FTPs.95 Furthermore, Internet gambling customers that 
use foreign accounts will be tempted to conceal gambling winnings 
from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).96 IRS audits of 
individuals often have trouble obtaining international bank 
records.97 The UIGEA’s objective to tackle fraud and money 
laundering, although well intentioned, has had the unintended 
consequence of incentivizing crimes such as tax evasion. 
In addition, American FTPs have lost revenue streams derived 
from fund transfer processing fees.98 The Agencies estimate that 
the cost to FTPs of complying with the PFUIG will surpass $100 
million in just the first year, without specifying an upward 
estimate.99 On the other hand, assuming a $6 billion domestic 
                                                          
94 See generally Miller, supra note 28 (arguing that U.S. legislation puts a 
heavy burden on domestic FTPs, decreasing competitiveness). 
95 There is no law that prohibits U.S. citizens and businesses from setting 
up foreign bank accounts. Id. at 206–07. Indeed, customers will want to avoid 
FTPs’ mistaken reasonable restrictions of legitimate transactions that have no 
redress in law. Id. at 203. Furthermore, multinational banks with a presence in 
the United States are in the uncomfortable position of taking measures to 
comply with the UIGEA, while at the same time providing financial services for 
legal Internet gambling clients abroad. See id. at 202–03. 
96 See Mark Scott, UBS U.S. Tax Dispute: Who Are the Winners, BUS. WK., 
Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/europeinsight/ 
archives/2009/08/ubs_us_tax_disp.html (describing an example of tax evasion in 
which wealthy Americans took advantage of “Switzerland and its famous bank 
secrecy rules”). 
97 See id. The dispute revolves around whether America has a right of 
access to the names of Americans potentially hiding vast sums of money from 
the IRS in Swiss bank accounts. See id. After months of negotiations, UBS 
released the names of about 4,450 American clients to the federal government. 
Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Disclosed Offshore Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/business/global/18irs.html?_r=2& 
hp. Some 10,000 people came forward voluntarily out of fear. See id. 
98 See Miller, supra note 28, at 216. 
99 See PFUIG, 73 Fed. Reg. at 69397.   
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Internet gambling industry, estimates of bank fees under a 
regulatory framework would total $420 million.100 The difference 
between these two numbers represents the total estimated loss to 
American FTPs—a minimum of half a billion dollars. 
Internationally, Internet gambling has become a recognized 
service industry.101 Over 80 countries have legalized and regulated 
the business.102 In 2003, the small island nation of Antigua, home 
to the most Internet gambling companies in the world, filed a 
complaint against the United States with the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) for instituting policies that constitute 
illegal trade restrictions in violation of the 1994 General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) treaty.103 In 2005, the 
WTO ruled against the United States,104 and later affirmed the 
decision on appeal in 2007.105 Although the GATS provides an 
exception to free trade policies in order to protect public morals, 
the WTO found that the United States’ laws treated traditional and 
online gambling differently, which presented a free trade 
violation.106 The WTO rejected the United States’ argument that 
there is a moral distinction between online and traditional 
gambling.107 In particular, the WTO noted that the IHA regulated 
and legalized Internet gambling for domestic horseracing, but 
excluded foreign competition.108  
In response, the United States took the unprecedented step of 
                                                          
100 Miller, supra note 28, at 216. 
101 Id. at 207. 
102 Rich Cholodofsky, Internet Gambling Perplexes Officials, TRIBLIVE 
(Jan. 15, 2006), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_413842.html. 
The list includes many first world important allies such as England. See id. 
103 Miller, supra note 28, at 207.  
104 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 340–73, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.antiguawto.com/ 
wto/51_Antigua%20_WTO_Appellate_Body_Report_7Apr05.pdf. 
105 See Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 7.1, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 
2007), available at http://www.antiguawto.com/wto/72Article215Paneldecision. 
pdf. 
106 Roysen, supra note 39, at 885. 
107 Id. at 884–85. 
108 See id. at 885. 
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unilaterally rescinding its GATS obligations with respect to 
Internet gambling.109 This is especially alarming because of the 
precedent it establishes. For example, China now has precedent to 
unilaterally rescind its WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) obligations after recently losing a WTO 
suit initiated by the United States. China’s infringement cost the 
American entertainment industry an estimated $3.7 billion in lost 
sales.110 The economic costs of the UIGEA will not be quarantined 
to Internet gambling. 
The WTO fiasco has been a financial boondoggle of epic 
proportions. Although the United States must pay Antigua only 
$21 million annually under the WTO’s order,111 the United States 
has subsequently settled with other nations, some of whom are 
powerful allies.112 For example, the European Union dropped its 
WTO claim against the United States in exchange for undisclosed 
benefits in other trade sectors.113 Commentators estimate that total 
settlements, including cash and trade concessions, could total $100 
billion.114 This number fails to capture losses to good will and 
American political capital.  
2. Social Costs 
Once market leaders, publicly traded Internet gambling sites 
                                                          
109 Miller, supra note 28, at 208. 
110 Lesley Cole, WTO Tells China It Must Do more to Combat Copyright 
Infringement, VENTURES (Feb. 19, 2009), http://venturesdialogue.ca/mainland-
china/2009/634/. 
111 Alex Binkley, Remote Gambling Legislation in the United States: A 
Burden on the System, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 537, 546 (2008). 
112 Miller, supra note 28, at 207–08 (stating that the U.S. government has 
negotiated settlements with nations including Australia, Japan, and the European 
Union). 
113 Id. at 208. It is alarming that the U.S. has provided concessions to other 
countries, but refuses to reveal the extent. Secrecy surrounding concessions, 
whether trade or cash, begs the inference that the concessions are enormous, or 
otherwise not in America’s best interests. This information is currently the 
subject of a claim under the Freedom of Information Act. Sarah Polson, 
Congressmen Request Trade Settlement Details, POKER LISTINGS (Apr. 2, 2008), 
http://www.pokerlistings.com/frank-paul-request-gats-agreement-24836. 
114 Miller, supra note 28, at 208. 
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can no longer service the lucrative American Internet gambling 
market.115 Publicly traded corporations are subject to increased 
oversight, transparency requirements, and fiduciary duties to 
shareholders.116 As a result, millions of American Internet 
gamblers must now rely on private companies in notoriously 
“under-regulated” countries.117 These companies refuse to publicly 
divulge their financial or employment information. As a result of 
lax oversight and government regulation, the industry has been 
plagued by several high-profile cheating scandals.118 In the under-
regulated Internet gambling market, the players themselves must 
uncover these nefarious plots because no specific regulations exist 
to mandate security and fairness.119 Ironically, the UIGEA forced 
Americans to switch from publicly traded, regulated, and secure 
Internet gambling sites, to privately owned, under-regulated 
sites.120 To consumers, the UIGEA has damaged the quality, 
                                                          
115 Bradley Vellarius, PartyPoker Leads Exodus of Public Companies out 
of U.S., RGT ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.rgtonline.com/Article.cfm? 
ArticleId=67868&CategoryName=Featured&SubCategoryName=. 
116 See id. 
117 PeterPaul Shaker, America’s Bad Bet: How the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Will Hurt the House, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 1183, 1200–01 (2007). Although no regulations existed at the 
industry’s inception, even Antigua has promulgated vague regulations requiring 
fairness. Tselnik, supra note 48, at 1639. There are no specific rules, however, 
to ensure this result. Id. Thus, the term under-regulated is used instead of 
unregulated. 
118 See, e.g., ‘60 Minutes’ on Sunday: How Online Gamblers Unmasked 
Cheaters, CNET NEWS (Nov. 26, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-
10108293-93.html (elaborating on the Absolute Poker scandal in which poker 
players themselves had to discover that a former employee could see everyone 
else’s cards and stealing 1.6 million in the process because there was no 
regulation to force gambling sites to stop cheaters); Gilbert M. Paul, Players 
Gamble on Honesty, Security of Internet Betting, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/29/ 
AR2008112901679.html (noting the Absolute Bet cheating scandal over a four 
year period inculcating the executives of the company). 
119 ’60 Minutes’ on Sunday, supra note 118. 
120 Compare ANNUAL REPORT 2008, PARTYGAMING (2008), 
http://annualreport 2008.partygaming.com/?id=29369 (providing very detailed 
information about the company’s business performance, financial statements, 
and governance) [hereinafter PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008], and 
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reliability and security of the services provided. 
In addition, the UIGEA perpetuates the stranglehold of foreign 
Internet gambling companies over the American market by 
prohibiting domestic competition. As a result, Congress is unable 
to enact further legislation to protect underage American gamblers, 
which was a principal motivation behind the UIGEA. Most 
Internet gambling companies, complying with the laws of their 
own country, only attempt to limit customers under the age of 
eighteen.121 The age checks that do exist are cursory at best. The 
more stringent sites require a photocopy of a valid government 
issued identification card indicating the user to be eighteen-years-
old.122 In the United States, state law governs age limits with 
respect to gambling, which range between sixteen and twenty-one, 
depending on the jurisdiction.123 In most states, the minimum 
required age for casino gambling is twenty-one, which is three 
years higher than in most other parts of the world.124 Thus, foreign 
                                                          
ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS, 888 HOLDINGS (2008), 
http://miranda.hemscott.com/ir/888/pdf/2008_Annual_Report.pdf (providing 
various reviews and reports on the state of the company as well as information 
on the company’s governance) [hereinafter 888 HOLDINGS], with POKERSTARS, 
http://www.pokerstars.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (providing no company 
information, not even its telephone contact number, on its website). PokerStars 
is a privately held company. Pokerstars, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/ 
companies/pokerstars.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).  
121 Most Internet gambling sites require a minimum age of 18 to gamble. 
See, e.g., PokerStars Responsible Gaming, POKERSTARS, http://www.pokerstars. 
com (last visited Sept. 8, 2010); PARTY POKER, http://www.partypoker.com (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
122 See, e.g., Responsible Gaming, FULL TILT POKER, http://www.full 
tiltpoker.com/realMoney.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (warning users that the 
company employs software that looks at drivers licenses or other government-
issued identification in order to verify that players are at least 18 years old). 
123 See I. Nelson Rose, Minimum Legal Age to Place a Bet, CASINO CITY 
TIMES (June 15, 2000), http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/article/minimum-legal-
age-to-place-a-bet-966. The legal gambling age in America varies precipitously. 
See id. Most states allow gamblers to buy lottery tickets at 18 and enter casinos 
at 21. See id. However, in a bizarre twist, Maine only requires a legal age of 16 
to gamble in casinos, but requires gamblers to be 18 for the lottery. See id. 
124 Great Britain allows 16 year olds to play slots and the lottery. James 
Chapman, Raise the Gambling Age to 18, say Tories, MAIL ONLINE (July 6, 
2007), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-466791/Raise-gambling-age-18-
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Internet gambling companies have little incentive to screen for 
underage American gamblers between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-one. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE 
On the other hand, the Regulation Bill, proposed by 
Representative Barney Frank, offers a framework to license and 
regulate the online gambling industry.125 The Regulation Bill 
currently has seventy cosponsors,126 and the Financial Services 
Committee has approved the bill.127 The Regulation Bill does not 
repeal the UIGEA; rather, it provides an exemption for all Internet 
gambling operations that first obtain a federal license.128 For all 
unlicensed foreign Internet gambling, the UIGEA would continue 
to prohibit restricted transactions.129 In addition, state governments 
that do not wish to participate may opt out.130 Unlike today’s 
online gambling industry, the opt-out would likely be honored by 
regulated domestic Internet gambling companies on penalty of 
fines.131 The U.S. government would actually collect these fines 
because the bill resolves the jurisdictional problems.132  
In addition, the Taxation Bill, proposed by James McDermott 
                                                          
say-Tories.html. Canada, on the other hand, requires gamblers to be 19 in some 
provinces and 18 in others. Reno Rollins, Gambling in Canada: Canadian 
Betting and Casino Laws, WORLD GAMBLING REVIEW, http://www.world 
gamblingreview.com/gambling/canada/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).  
125 Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. (2009). 
126 H.R. 2267: Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd? 
bill=h111-2267 (last visited Sept. 14, 2010). 
127 FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE (July 27, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Hearings/hearingDetails.aspx?NewsID=1340. 
The Financial Services Committee approved the Regulation Bill with numerous 
amendments. See id. This Note incorporates those amendments. 
128 See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. § 5383(b) (2009). 
129 See id. 
130 Id. § 5386(a). 
131 Id. § 5386(c). 
132 Id. 
 Is the Deck Stacked Against Internet Gambling? 251 
and cosponsored by Barney Frank, operates in tandem with the 
Regulation Bill.133 The Taxation Bill taxes licensed Internet 
gambling companies, charges fees for the licensing process, and 
ensures that gamblers’ winnings are documented for tax 
purposes.134 Together, the Proposed Bills tax, license and regulate 
domestic Internet gambling companies. This section will 
categorically evaluate the costs and benefits of the Proposed Bills. 
A. The Benefits of the Proposed Alternatives 
The Proposed Bills would bestow several benefits to American 
government, companies and citizens. Part 1 examines how the 
government would benefit through increased revenue and 
oversight and Part 2 details the benefits to American companies 
and citizens through increased revenue and employment 
opportunities. Part 3 addresses the social benefits such as reduced 
cheating and underage gambling. These categories facilitate a 
comparison between the benefits of the UIGEA and the likely 
benefits of the Proposed Bills. 
1. Increased Government Revenue and Enforcement 
Currently, foreign Internet gambling companies render 
gambling services to Americans, but avoid paying American 
taxes.135 As gross revenue and profits from Americans 
participating in Internet gambling continue to increase in real 
terms, lost government revenue in the form of unpaid taxes is also 
increasing.136 An independent 2008 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
report estimates that the U.S. government would collect nearly $40 
                                                          
133 Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 
2268, 111th Cong. (2009).   
134 Id. §§ 4491, 6050X. 
135 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, ESTIMATE OF FEDERAL REVENUE 
EFFECT OF PROPOSAL TO REGULATE AND TAX ONLINE GAMBLING (2008), 
available at http://www.safeandsecureig.org/media/pwctaxanalysis.pdf (noting 
the American government would reap 56% of additional estimated revenue from 
individual income taxes).  
136 See supra Part II.B.1. The federal government loses tax revenue from 
both foreign Internet gambling companies and individual Americans. 
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billion in revenue over the next 10 years from a regulated Internet 
gambling market, assuming all states opt in.137 Individual income 
taxes, which are automatically reported to the IRS, would 
constitute 56% of the estimated $40 billion in additional 
government revenue.138 The Proposed Bills further mandate that 
licensed Internet gambling companies maintain and submit 
detailed records to the IRS, including each gambler’s personal 
information, gross winnings, gross losses, gross wagers, net 
winnings, and withheld taxes.139 No longer would the government 
rely on the good faith tax filings of Internet gamblers. The 
proposed requirements for Internet gambling are even more 
stringent than those for traditional casinos, which should result in 
lower enforcement costs and a larger gross taxable income.140  
Under the Taxation Bill, the government would reap a 2% 
annual tax on the total funds deposited by customers.141 To ensure 
compliance, the Proposed Bills provide oversight and enforcement 
mechanisms.142 For example, the Treasury Department 
(“Treasury”) may perform audits to ensure that Internet gambling 
companies maintain adequate bookkeeping.143 Failure to abide by 
                                                          
137  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 135. The report gives different 
estimates for differing numbers of opt-in states. Id. Because the Regulation Bill 
currently prohibits bets on sports other than horseracing, the numbers provided 
are lower than if the Regulation Bill permitted all types of wagers. Id. 
138 Id. This figure exposes the rate of personal income tax evasion.  See id. 
139 H.R. 2268 § 6050x(a)-(b). 
140 See Nevada Gambling: What You Need to Know, LAS VEGAS 4 
NEWBIES, http://lasvegas4newbies.com/chap10-1.html (last visited Sept. 8, 
2010). Casinos report gambling winnings for these games to the IRS when a 
player wins $1,200 or more from a bingo game or slot machine or if the 
proceeds are $1,500 or more from a keno game. Id. There is no withholding or 
reporting for table games in Nevada (such as blackjack, baccarat, craps, roulette 
or other spinning wheel games) because the casinos do not know the amount of 
the wager and are unable to determine taxable gain from winnings. Id. Thus 
table game winners probably do not report their gambling profits to the IRS. Id. 
The laws for traditional casinos change from game to game, and also vary from 
state to state. Keeping abreast of these laws for the average gambling customer 
is nearly impossible. 
141 See H.R. 2268 § 4491(a). 
142 See, e.g., Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. §§ 5383(k)(1)–(2) (2009). 
143 See id. Internet gambling companies carry the financial burden to 
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these rules may result in penalties ranging from a maximum of 
$100,000 to revocation of the gaming license.144 Although 
$100,000 is too low, the license itself would be worth millions in 
annual profits for a market leader, and thereby incentivize 
compliance. 
Faced with state and federal budget crises,145 states have 
flocked to increase taxes and government revenue from traditional 
gambling.146 For example, “[i]n Ohio, Governor Strickland 
reversed his stance on video slots at racetracks based on a 
‘conservative’ estimate that the new machines would net more than 
$760 million to the state.”147 California has considered proposals to 
initiate an intrastate online poker market.148 Pennsylvania, seeing 
an opportunity to capture gambling revenue from Atlantic City, 
opened a new casino in Bethlehem.149 If state governments collect 
billions of dollars in annual revenue from traditional gambling, 
why prohibit Internet gambling that offers the same games? 
In addition, the Regulation Bill remedies the current 
jurisdictional problems by compelling foreign Internet gambling 
sites to subject themselves to U.S. jurisdiction.150 Internet 
                                                          
produce and deliver all required documents. Id. § 5383(k)(2)(B). 
144 Id. § 5383(i)-(l). 
145 See, e.g., Claire Suddath, Spotlight: California’s Budget Crisis, TIME, 
July 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1910985,00. 
html; Lori Montgomery, Federal Budget Deficit to Exceed $1.4 Trillion in 2010 
and 2011, WASH. POST, July 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/AR2010072304101.html. 
146 Ian Urbina, States Face Drop in Gambling Revenues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/10gambling.html?hp.  
147 Id. 
148 Dan Cypra, California Intrastate Online Poker Update, POKER NEWS 
DAILY (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.pokernewsdaily.com/california-intrastate-
online-poker-update-4537/. The UIGEA specifically exempts intrastate Internet 
gambling. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 
5362(10)(B)(i) (West 2010). 
149 Dice Now Rolling at Sands Casino, 69 NEWS, (July 18, 2010), 
http://www.wfmz.com/lehighvalleynews/24302372/detail.html. While states 
compete with one another to capture the largest share of gambling revenue, the 
federal government squanders potential gambling revenue to foreign nations 
through the UIGEA. See supra Part II.B.1. 
150 See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2268, 111th Cong. § 5383(c)(2)(E) (2009). 
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gambling companies will have to “maintain all facilities within the 
United States for processing of bets or wagers made or placed from 
the United States.”151 Even if some facilities are located abroad, 
licensees are subject to administrative summonses to produce 
records and data within 500 miles of the licensee’s place of 
business in the United States.152 The Treasury would not have to 
travel internationally to oversee Internet gambling operations. 
By requiring Internet gambling companies to submit to United 
States jurisdiction, the federal government would be able to 
enforce compliance with state opt-outs, age requirements and other 
state specific requirements.153 Regulators would be able to 
determine the gambler’s physical location and age by, for example, 
cross-referencing information from governmental databases with 
the customer’s credit history.154 In contrast, under the UIGEA, 
foreign Internet gambling companies do not even attempt to 
comply with American law.155 The Proposed Bills provide 
sanctions for non-compliance, thereby avoiding the current 
situation in which Internet gambling companies flagrantly 
“ignor[e] and circumvent[] the State laws.”156 
                                                          
151 Id. amend. 8, § 5383(k)(1)(D) (as offered by Rep. John Campbell, 
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010), accord id. amend. 16, (as offered 
by Rep. Roger Sherman, Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).  
152 See id. § 5383(k)(2)(A). The United States is not responsible for any 
expenses incurred by Internet gambling companies in compliance with these 
summonses. Id. § 5383(k)(2)(B). 
153 See id. § 5386(a). 
154 SAFE AND SECURE INTERNET GAMBLING INITIATIVE, REGULATED 
INTERNET GAMBLING AND AGE-VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES EFFECTIVE IN 
COMBATING UNDERAGE INTERNET GAMBLING (2007), available at 
http://www.safeandsecureig.org/media/underagerelease.pdf. The technology has 
advanced to the point where given access to governmental databases, such as the 
DMV and Social Security Administration, the government can realistically 
require effective age and residency verifications. See id. 
155 See supra Part II.B.1. 
156 152 CONG. REC. S11045-01 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Jon Kyl), available at 2006 WL 3330257. Ironically, this quote from Senator 
Kyl comes from the UIGEA’s legislative history. Senator Kyl lamented foreign 
Internet gambling companies flagrantly disregarding state law. See id. Now, 
foreign Internet gambling companies flagrantly disregard both federal and state 
law. See supra Part I. 
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2. The Benefit to Private American Companies  
The Proposed Bills would pave the way for an American 
takeover of the Internet gambling service industry. Under this 
framework, American Internet gambling companies would serve 
the majority of the domestic market and compete for a share of the 
foreign market.157 To achieve these ends, the Regulation Bill 
excludes the current foreign Internet gambling market leaders and 
their executives from eligibility to obtain a license.158 No person or 
company may obtain an Internet gambling license that has 
previously committed a felony or is delinquent in filing any federal 
or state tax returns.159 In particular, the Regulation Bill provides 
that any person, company or affiliate that accepted a bet from a 
person located inside the United States after the enactment of the 
UIGEA, or provided financial assistance to that end, is ineligible to 
obtain a license.160 All foreign private Internet gambling 
companies currently accepting American wagers clearly satisfy 
these criteria.161 The bill also delegates broad discretionary power 
to the Treasury to deny applications in order to “protect the public 
trust.”162 If passed, the Proposed Bills would capture a multibillion 
dollar industry for American companies. 
PartyGaming, the former Internet poker market leader publicly 
traded on the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) and located in 
Gibraltar, recognized the possibility that the United States may 
regulate the online gambling market. PartyGaming responded by 
negotiating a $105 million settlement with the U.S. Attorney’s 
                                                          
157 As opposed to the current situation in which $6 billion flow directly to 
foreign companies. See supra Part II.A. 
158 See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. § 5383(d)(3)(D) (2009) (barring 
applicants who are delinquent in filing taxes owed to the U.S.). 
159 Id. § 5383(d)(3)(C)-(D). 
160 Id. amend. 15, § 5383(d)(3)(E)-(G) (as offered by Rep. Spencer Bachus, 
Rep. Michele Bachman, Members, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). 
161 See id. In addition, publicly traded foreign Internet gambling companies 
failed to pay taxes to the American government for services provided to 
American customers before the enactment of the UIGEA. Grahmann, supra note 
11, at 166. 
162 See H.R. 2267 § 5383(d)(5). 
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office in New York for prior actions contrary to American law.163 
In return, the United States agreed to refrain from prosecuting the 
company or its executives.164 Commentators speculate that the 
online gambling giant is attempting to fulfill the obligations under 
the Regulation Bill in order to be eligible to obtain an American 
online gambling license.165 Other Internet gambling companies do 
not share the optimism of PartyGaming, and assume that if Internet 
gambling is regulated, licenses will be limited to American 
gambling leaders such as Harrah’s and MGM.166 The mere 
possibility that Congress will pass the Regulation Bill, and 
PartyGaming could share in the action, has generated over $100 
million in government revenue. 
Moreover, the regulation of Internet gambling companies 
would create thousands of skilled domestic jobs.167 In addition to 
computer programmers, Internet gambling companies employ 
marketers, customer service representatives, lawyers, and 
technicians.168 In 2008, PartyGaming employed 1,191 people169 
                                                          
163 Pfanner, supra note 7. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See Jon Parker, PartyGaming, 888 and America: Different Strokes, 
EGAMING REVIEW (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.egrmagazine.com/features/ 
261757/feature-partygaming-888-and-america-different-strokes.thtml. In the late 
90’s, MGM ran an Internet gambling site successfully in the hope that America 
would change its stance towards the industry. When it became clear America 
would take steps to prohibit the industry, MGM decided it was not worth the 
legal risk and potential public relations fallout and shut down its operations. 
DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION AND THE 
INTERNET 185 (William R. Eadington ed., 2005); Lisa M. Bowman, MGM 
Mirage Shutters Online Casino, CNET NEWS (June 4, 2003, 11:45 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1026_3-1013085.html. American companies already 
have the expertise to manage the industry efficiently. 
167  PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 120, at 67 
(exemplifying an Internet gambling company with robust employment 
opportunities that, if forced to move to America, would employ thousands of 
Americans).  
168 Id. at 65–67. 
169 Id. at 67. Comparing the employment statistics from before and after the 
passage of the UIGEA, PartyGaming only employed 200 less employees, a drop 
of less than 20%. Id. at 69. This data suggests that to run an Internet gambling 
site correctly, a company needs several hundred employees, thereby providing 
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despite the fact that the UIGEA eviscerated 58% of its stock value 
at the end of 2006.170 Similarly, 888 Holdings, which is also 
publicly traded and based out of Gibraltar, employed 931 people in 
the 2008 fiscal year.171 The Regulation Bill capitalizes on the 
potential for job creation and requires that the majority of all the 
employees, officers and affiliated business entities of licensed 
Internet gambling corporations be American citizens or 
residents.172   
The industry will also generate opportunities in business 
sectors outside of Internet gambling.173 For example, 888 Holdings 
spent $80.2 million on marketing in 2008.174 A regulated Internet 
gambling industry disperses profits and employment opportunities 
to diverse business sectors. Contrary to some commentators’ 
assertions,175 the Internet gambling industry provides robust 
employment opportunities, training programs and competitive 
salaries.176 Considering the current high unemployment rates,177 
the United States should be proactive in attracting high paying, 
skilled employment opportunities. 
Additionally, American FTPs would benefit from the proposed 
                                                          
relatively stable employment regardless of market fluctuations. 
170 Vellarius, supra note 115. 
171 888 HOLDINGS, supra note 120, at 31–50. 
172 Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend. 16, § 5383(k)(1)(C)–(F) (as offered by 
Rep. Roger Sherman, Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). This 
section will be null and void if the WTO rules that it violates free trade 
agreements. However, after the unilateral withdrawal from GATS, and the large 
settlement payments that resulted, the WTO would have to find a violation of 
some other agreement. See supra Part II.B.1. 
173 See Miller, supra note 28, at 202, for a discussion of how banks will 
benefit from licensing and regulating online gambling. 
174 See 888 HOLDINGS, supra note 120, at 14. 
175 See, e.g., Grahmann, supra note 11, at 165–66 (noting that one Internet 
gambling site startup employed just seventeen people compared to the 
traditional and highly capitalized Harrah’s opening in New Orleans employing 
4,259). 
176 See PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 120, at 65–67. 
177 See BUREAU OF LABOR AND STATISTICS, NEWS RELEASE: THE 
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—AUGUST 2010 (Sept. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf. The rate has hovered around 
10%. See id.  
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legislation. Licensing and regulating the Internet gambling industry 
would increase American FTPs’ global competitiveness and 
profitability by mitigating the financial costs of the UIGEA.178 
Americans, who currently make up a substantial amount of Internet 
gamblers throughout the world,179 would have a large incentive to 
gamble with American online gambling companies due to better 
security and ease of access to the services. American customers 
would use American FTPs’ to process fund transfers.180 FTPs will 
collect fees conservatively estimated at $420 million.181 In order to 
address concerns regarding excessive debt through the use of 
credit, the Regulation Bill continues the UIGEA’s prohibition on 
the use of credit cards for Internet gambling.182 
Despite these financial benefits, FTPs would still incur costs to 
comply with the provisions of the UIGEA. The UIGEA cannot be 
repealed because if Congress repeals the UIGEA and enacts the 
Proposed Bills, established foreign Internet gambling companies 
would compete equally with licensed domestic Internet gambling 
companies. Under the Proposed Bills, domestic companies would 
incur federal licensing fees, taxes and regulations that foreign 
private companies would not.183 Therefore, without protection 
from unlicensed foreign competition, federally licensed Internet 
gambling companies would be at a significant competitive 
disadvantage, and the newly created domestic Internet gambling 
industry would be destined to fail. Therefore, if Congress passes 
the Proposed Bills, Congress cannot repeal the UIGEA as applied 
                                                          
178 The bills would increase banks global competitiveness by at least half a 
billion dollars a year. See supra Part II.B.1. 
179 See Gale, supra note 4, at 534. 
180 Customers will most likely use debit cards to fund Internet gambling 
accounts because they are the most convenient method other than credit cards, 
which are prohibited under the Proposed Bills. Internet Gambling Regulation, 
Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend. 12, 
§ 5388(a) (as offered by Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Services Comm., 
July 28, 2010). 
181 See Miller, supra note 28, at 216.  
182 H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend. 12, § 5388(a) (as offered by Rep. 
Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). The bill 
provides a grandfather exception for persons already licensed under the IHA. 
See id. § 5388(b)(1). 
183 See supra Part III.A.1. 
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to unlicensed Internet gambling companies. 
3. Social Benefits: Increased Security and Responsible Gaming  
The Regulation Bill requires Internet gambling companies to 
adequately protect customers.184 No longer would foreign Internet 
gambling companies “self-regulate.”185 Companies would lose 
their license or face civil fines for failing to take “appropriate 
safeguards to protect the privacy and security of any person 
engaged in Internet gambling.”186 To obtain a license, companies 
must create a detailed plan to guarantee that games are fair.187 To 
ensure strict adherence to these vetted plans, the Treasury may 
issue summonses to inspect books, records and data of Internet 
gambling companies.188 The Treasury would also test Internet 
gambling code to ascertain whether measures taken to protect 
security and eliminate cheating are adequate.189 By bringing 
Internet gambling under government control, customers’ would 
benefit from enhanced security. 
In addition, the Regulation Bill would compel companies to 
maintain mechanisms to combat “fraud, money laundering, and 
terrorist finance.”190 Currently, the UIGEA does not stop money 
laundering through privately owned foreign Internet gambling 
companies if players use foreign FTPs. Moreover, the money, once 
deposited in a foreign bank account, can be wired to a domestic 
bank account, without violating the provisions of the UIGEA.191 
                                                          
184 Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act, H.R. 2268, 111th Cong. § 5383(g) (2009).   
185 Some commentators have suggested that Internet gambling companies 
have implemented significant security, privacy protection and problem gambling 
support policies through “self-regulation.” E.g., Valasek, supra note 27, at 774–
80. However, the efficacy of such regulation is highly dubious given the 
cheating scandals and rampant tax evasion prevalent today. See supra Parts 
II.B.2, III.A.3.  
186 H.R. 2268 §§ 5383(g)(7), (i)(l) (2009). The Treasury would be 
responsible for promulgating additional regulations. Id. § 5383(k)(1)(B). 
187 Id. § 5383(c)(2)(D)(ii). 
188 See id. §§ 5383(k), 5384(b).  
189 Id. § 5383(k)(1)(F). 
190 Id. § 5383(g)(5). 
191 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5361 
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The Regulation Bill attacks money laundering more effectively by 
granting the federal government access to the paper trail.192 
Accordingly, the United States would gain a considerable 
advantage in the battle against money laundering.  
Additionally, the Regulation Bill levies penalties against 
individuals who cheat in Internet gambling games.193 Those 
convicted of using any type of cheating device may be 
permanently barred from all Internet gambling sites and subject to 
a fine or up to five years’ imprisonment.194 These measures are 
necessary because cheaters have not been punished adequately in 
the past.195 Poker is especially vulnerable to cheating methods such 
as individuals colluding, using multiple aliases at one table, or 
dumping chips in tournaments.196 However, Internet poker 
companies currently have an incentive to conceal breaches of 
security rather than undertake potentially expensive and 
embarrassing regulatory mechanisms to minimize cheating. The 
penalties under the Regulation Bill address these perverse 
incentives. 
To obtain a license, applicants must submit a proposed 
program to prohibit underage gambling, provide responsible 
gaming materials, and enact regulation as the Treasury, state 
                                                          
(West 2010) (providing no mention of a prohibition in bank to bank wire 
transfers).   
192 H.R. 2268 § 5383(k). 
193 Id. § 5390. 
194 Id. Cheating is defined broadly including hacking the system code, 
colluding with other players or using any device to obtain an advantage with the 
intent to defraud a licensee or other player. Id. 
195 See ABSOLUTE POKER SCANDAL, http://www.absolutepokerscandal. 
com/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (describing a cheating scandal implicating 
employees at an online poker site, which was not uncovered by authorities, but 
by other players). See also supra Part II.B.1. 
196 See Cheating in Online Poker, TIGHT POKER, http://www.tight 
poker.com/online_poker_cheating.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (defining 
collusion as when two players act in concert around one poker table). Using 
multiple aliases happens when one player controls what appears to be several 
players around one table. Id. Chip dumping occurs when one player purposely 
loses his chips to another player in a tournament, which gives the remaining 
player a significant advantage.  Id. 
 Is the Deck Stacked Against Internet Gambling? 261 
regulator, or tribal regulatory board mandates.197 For example, to 
help combat problem gambling, the Treasury would require 
Internet gambling companies to maintain a privacy-protected 
national “List of Persons Self-Excluded from Gambling 
Activities.”198 Moreover, to begin gambling, players must 
electronically submit maximum loss limits by the hour, day, week, 
or month, at the discretion of the player.199 Upon, reaching this 
preordained amount, licensee sites may not honor any gambling 
winnings or losses.200 Gamblers who have outstanding child 
support payments would be automatically excluded from Internet 
gambling sites.201 These measures would help minimize some of 
the social costs of problem gambling. 
The Regulation Bill also establishes the legal Internet gambling 
age at 21 in order to avoid disparate state laws and promote 
effective monitoring of underage gamblers.202 Further, the 
Regulation Bill prohibits advertisements that target minors and 
provides for sanctions, including the revocation of the license 
and/or a fine, for a licensee “whose minor protection software, 
mechanisms, and other systems are found to be insufficiently 
effective.”203 To properly monitor compliance with these 
provisions, the Regulation Bill requires annual reports on the status 
of Internet gambling regulation, including the efficacy of 
protections against underage and problem gambling.204 The 
Regulation Bill also provides regulators the power to investigate 
licensees to enforce these regulations.205 These provisions would 
                                                          
197 See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. § 5384(b) (2009).   
198 See id. § 5384(c).  
199 Id. amend. 8, § 5384(b)(1)(G) (as offered by Rep. John Campbell, 
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). 
200 Id. § 5384(c). 
201 Id. amend. 13(a), § 5384(b)(3) (as offered by Rep. Barney Frank, 
Chairman, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). 
202 Id. amend. 8, § 5384(b)(1)(B) (as offered by Rep. John Campbell, 
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).  
203 Id. amend. 11, § 5384(p) (as offered by Rep. Melissa Bean, Rep. Mary 
Jo Kilroy, Members, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010).  
204 See id. § 3(b)(5).  
205 Id. § 5383(o).  
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help minimize underage gambling.  
To further address the social costs of Internet gambling, the 
federal government could use the billions of dollars in additional 
revenue from Internet gambling to finance programs designed to 
ameliorate the social costs of Internet gambling. Currently, the 
federal government does not fund any programs or research for 
problem gambling.206 Representative Jim Moran recently proposed 
the first attempt by federal legislators to understand and attack this 
problem.207 However, the bill provides that “it is the sense of the 
Congress that every state should contribute a percentage of its 
revenue from gambling [to the program].”208 States are unlikely to 
comply with “senses of Congress” absent federal authority to 
compel states to act. Without adequate funding, meaningful 
research and programs have not been developed. In contrast, the 
Regulation Bill requires the public availability of detailed statistics 
and logs on gambling behavior.209 The Proposed Bills provide the 
funds, tools, and knowledge necessary to tackle social costs 
particular to Internet gambling. 
B. The Costs of Regulation 
Community groups and activists often oppose the construction 
of new casinos.210 Traditional casinos tend to attract crime and 
                                                          
206 See Terry Goodwin, U.S. Government Tackles Problem Gambling in 




207 See Comprehensive Problem Gambling Act of 2009, H.R. 2906, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
208 See id. § 7 (emphasis added). 
209 H.R. 2267, amend. 17, § 5383(k)(4) (as offered by Rep. Mary Jo Kilroy, 
Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). This database would be 
enormously helpful to properly assess the effects of Internet gambling. 
Currently, researchers must use foreign databases and educated guesses to 
determine the extent of the Internet gambling market. Anonymous publicly 
disseminated Internet gambling information would facilitate an analysis of the 
precise social and economic costs and benefits associated with this industry. 
210 See, e.g., Michael Levinson, Church Facing Uphill Fight on Casino, 
BOSTON.COM (Aug. 12, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/ 
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social ills such as drunk driving, prostitution, bankruptcies, 
personal debt, and cheating.211 Problem gamblers accumulate an 
average of $55,000 to $90,000 of debt.212 After casinos opened in 
Atlantic City total crimes increased by 100%.213 If Internet 
gambling follows comparable trends, every community in the 
United States could suffer a similar increase of social costs. 
Although Internet casinos can avoid some of the crime normally 
associated with traditional casinos—such as prostitution, drunk 
driving and petty theft, because Internet gambling does not require 
a physical presence—regulated Internet gambling would likely 
increase problem gambling and underage gambling, perhaps even 
at a rate higher than traditional gambling.214 
Problem gambling is a serious condition that affects not just the 
gambler, but also his social network.215 Although the industry is 
new and statistics are scarce, common sense dictates that increased 
access to gambling services would increase the incidence of 
problem gambling. However, because many Americans already 
have access to gambling, either traditional gambling or illegal 
foreign Internet gambling, problem gambling is unlikely to 
increase significantly. Nevertheless, increased rates of problem 
gambling, and the strain on the community, are among the most 
serious social costs of the Proposed Bills.  
Internet gambling could increase social costs in other ways as 
well. For example, the anonymity of Internet gambling provides 
underage gamblers an opportunity to circumvent age 
restrictions.216 Unlike traditional casinos, there is no physical 
                                                          
2007/08/12/church_facing_uphill_fight_on_casino/. 
211 See NGISC, ch.7, supra note 3. 
212 GAMBLING FACTS AND STATISTICS, http://www.overcominggambling. 
com/facts.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). 
213 Id. 
214 See NGISC, ch. 5, supra note 85. 
215 See NGISC, ch. 7, supra note 3, at 7-18 (stating that those who suffer 
from problem gambling engage in behavior that is destructive to their families, 
their work, and even their communities).  
216 See NGISC, ch. 5, supra note 85, at 5-4 to 5-5. It is important to note 
that while the UIGEA relies almost exclusively on this report, the NGISC’s 
conclusions are not derived from empirical research on trends in Internet 
gambling. For example, the conclusion that underage gamblers are at particular 
risk comes from the observation that young people use the Internet more 
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inspection of a state issued identification. Should new technology 
prove unable to adequately detect underage gamblers,217 Internet 
gambling may fuel problem gambling and addiction at young ages. 
Although age detection technology has progressed significantly 
since the National Gambling Impact Study,218 the potential for 
underage gamblers to wager over the Internet is another social cost 
that weighs against regulating Internet gambling. However, it is 
important to recognize that while the provisions of the Regulation 
Bill may not detect every underage gambler, the UIGEA has no 
provision to specifically prevent underage gambling. Certainly, 
underage gamblers must make up some portion of the estimated $6 
billion Americans currently gamble over the Internet. 
In addition, the Proposed Bills would likely further injure 
foreign relations. Although the United States has already rescinded 
its GATS obligations with regard to Internet gambling, the 
Proposed Bills are protectionist policies.219 In response, foreign 
nations may erect trade barriers in other trade sectors to 
counterbalance these impediments to the free market. Depending 
on the severity of international reaction and damage to 
relationships with allies, this cost may be enormous from both a 
financial and social aspect. 
Finally, there is the unquantifiable moral objection. The 
objection is unquantifiable because no benefit, no matter how 
extraordinary, can outweigh the moral objection.220 Those who see 
                                                          
frequently. Id. at 5-4. The NGISC does not address whether age verification 
through regulation would better protect against underage gambling. See id. 
217 Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act, H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. amend 8, §5384(b)(1)(A) (as offered by Rep. John 
Campbell, Member, Fin. Services Comm., July 28, 2010). Although the 
Regulation Bill opens real time government databases to Internet gambling 
companies for age verification purposes, the technology has yet to be tested. 
Further, it is easy to conceive of ways that minors would be able to circumvent 
rules because Internet gambling never requires a personal physical verification 
of the identification. 
218 Id. (allowing access to government databases). 
219 Miller, supra note 28, at 208. 
220 See, e.g., Michael K. Chung, Editorial, Gambling is Exploitative, 
Immoral, THE TECH, Oct. 5, 1993, http://tech.mit.edu/V113/N47/chung.47o.html 
(arguing that the money and increased tourism which could result from opening 
casinos are not sufficient reasons for opening casinos because gambling is 
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gambling as immoral will fundamentally object to the government 
profiting from this “vice.”221 However, American governments 
have profited from gambling since at least the early 1960s.222 If 
gambling is truly immoral, then all gambling should be outlawed, 
not just Internet gambling. Until that day, Congress should treat 
Internet gambling and traditional gambling alike, and reject the 
unreasonable argument that Internet gambling is immoral while 
traditional gambling is not.223 
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Further improvements to the Proposed Bills could increase the 
benefits, decrease the costs and, thus, increase the net benefit to the 
United States. First, the legislation should allocate a portion of the 
government revenue derived from the Proposed Bills to programs 
designed to combat social costs specific to Internet gambling. A 
small percentage of the $40 billion in increased revenue over the 
next ten years could fund meaningful progress towards reducing 
underage and problem gambling.224 Indeed, the proposed bills 
could fund the problem gambling research proposed by the 
Comprehensive Problem Gaming Act.225 Furthermore, Congress 
could fund research toward state of the art age verification and 
problem gambling detection methods.226 Although the Treasury 
may need some flexibility to enact these measures, a budget floor 
should be set to adequately address the social costs of licensed 
Internet gambling.  
Second, the legislation should include language requiring 
                                                          
simply immoral; criticizing the government for exploiting citizens in the name 
of increasing revenues).  
221 See id. 
222 See, e.g., 7 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 490 (15th ed. 2005) 
(stating that the Louisiana lottery had acquired enormous profits by 1963). 
223 This Note does not address unquantifiable arguments such as the desire 
to maximize personal freedom and minimize government paternalism. Like the 
moral argument, these arguments cannot be quantified as a cost or benefit. 
224 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 135. 
225 See supra Part III.A.iii. 
226 See Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2268, 11th Cong. § 3(b)(5) (2009). 
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licensees to obtain consent from foreign gamblers to submit to U.S. 
jurisdiction. Although the Regulation Bill provides both civil and 
criminal penalties for cheaters,227 absent gamblers’ consent to U.S. 
jurisdiction, foreign cheaters are unlikely to be brought to justice. 
American prosecutors would face the same jurisdictional problems 
presented by foreign privately owned Internet gambling companies 
violating the UIGEA.228 Alternatively, the Regulation Bill could 
levy a large fine against Internet gambling companies for breaches 
of security. Although individual cheaters would not be brought to 
justice in this scenario, the fine would give companies a strong 
incentive to proactively prevent cheating.  
Third, Congress should raise the maximum civil fines levied on 
Internet gambling companies for violating the provisions of the 
Regulation bill. In 2008, PartyGaming posted almost half a billion 
dollars in revenue and nearly $80 million in profit.229 The current 
$100,000 maximum fine amounts to less than one day of profit.230 
Thus, the Treasury’s two options for punishment are to revoke the 
company’s license or invoke a paltry penalty. One option is too 
severe and the other is too lenient. To address this issue, the 
Treasury should have the discretion to levy fines of up to $10 
million, while retaining the same mitigating factors.231 
These suggestions should increase the benefits, decrease the 
costs and eliminate loopholes to the Proposed Bills. The 
modifications, which address the concerns that gave rise to the 
UIGEA, would thus increase the net benefit of the Proposed Bills.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite the enactment of the UIGEA, Americans continue to 
                                                          
227  Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement 
Act, H.R. 2267, 11th Cong. § 5390 (2009). 
228 See supra Part I. 
229 PARTYGAMING ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 120, at 104. 
PartyGaming posts these figures even without access to the American market. 
See Parker, supra note 166.  
230 See H.R. 2267 § 5383(l)(1)(A). 
231 See id. § 5383(l)(2)(D) (listing good faith, gravity of the violation and 
size of the financial resources of the company as factors in determining the 
penalty amount). 
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gamble over the Internet and represent a significant portion of total 
global Internet gambling revenue.232 This money goes directly 
overseas, but the social costs of Internet gambling—such as 
addiction and bankruptcy—remain in the United States. While the 
UIGEA has unsuccessfully addressed these concerns by attempting 
to prohibit Internet gambling, the Proposed Bills would capture the 
benefits of the industry and develop regulations to minimize the 
costs. 
Financially, the Proposed Bills are unquestionably superior to 
the UIGEA. The United States government would reap nearly $40 
billion over the next ten years and private American companies 
would compete for a multibillion dollar domestic Internet 
gambling market. Eventually, licensed domestic Internet gambling 
companies would make inroads into foreign Internet gambling 
markets and increase the financial benefits to the United States. 
The newly created domestic Internet gambling industry would 
create skilled jobs and business opportunities in diverse sectors of 
the economy such as advertising and marketing. Instead, the 
United States now hemorrhages billions of dollars directly to 
private illegal foreign Internet gambling companies. Furthermore, 
American FTPs will spend an estimated $100 million to comply 
with the PFUIG in just the first year of the PFUIG’s passage.233 
On the other hand, it is less clear whether the Proposed Bills 
will decrease or increase social costs and, if they do, by how much. 
With respect to the security of gambling services, regulated 
Internet gambling companies subject to punishment by the U.S. 
government would be superior to under-regulated foreign 
gambling companies. However, the Proposed Bills would increase 
the numbers of American gamblers and, thus, probably increase 
the numbers of underage and problem gamblers. The pivotal issue 
is the extent to which the provisions of the Proposed Bills would 
ameliorate these social costs. Although unknown numbers of 
underage and problem gamblers currently exist under the UIGEA 
and would exist under the Proposed Bills, the Proposed Bills 
attempt to counteract these social costs, while the UIGEA does 
                                                          
232 Pfanner, supra note 7.  
233 Supra Part II.B.1. 
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not.234 Surely confronting these social costs and attempting a 
solution is more desirable to ignoring the problem wholesale. 
Unfortunately, even if Congress passes the Proposed Bills, the 
absence of information with respect to the current social costs of 
Internet gambling would provide no baseline with which to 
compare whether the Proposed Bills have decreased or increased 
these social costs such as problem gambling and underage 
gambling.235  
Over all, the benefits of the Proposed Bills far outweigh the 
benefits of the UIGEA. Under either framework, millions of 
Americans will gamble over the Internet. Under the UIGEA, the 
United States reaps none of the benefits of Internet gambling but 
retains the costs. On the other hand, under the Proposed Bills, the 
United States would exploit the benefits and mitigate the 
potentially higher costs of an increased domestic Internet gambling 
market. With higher benefits and social costs that are addressed 
instead of ignored, the Proposed Bills provide a larger net benefit 
to the United States than does the UIGEA. 
Internet gambling is not meaningfully different than traditional 
gambling. Faced with an economic crisis, the federal government 
should capture this multibillion dollar industry for the United 
                                                          
234 Compare supra Part II.B.2. (noting the lack of protection against 
cheating and underage gambling under the UIGEA), with supra Part III.A.3. 
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survey on the prevalence of problem gambling since regulating Internet 
gambling in 2005. See British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010, GAMBLING 
COMMISSION, 
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/research__consultations/research/bgps/
bgps_2010.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). England began keeping statistics in 
2000. See British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2000, GAMBLING COMMISSION, 
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/research__consultations/research/bgps/
bgps_2000.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). To the extent American problem 
gambling trends are comparable to English trends, the study should be 
informative on the effects regulating Internet gambling will have on problem 
gambling in America. 
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States. The successful implementation of Internet gambling 
regulation by our international allies demonstrates the potential for 
success domestically.236 The United States’ national interests are 
best served by controlling this industry, reaping its benefits, and 
effectively regulating it to minimize its costs.  
                                                          
236 See generally GAMBLING COMMISSION, http://www.gambling 
commission.gov.uk/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010). 
